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Abstract
Abstract: This study aims to reveal and discuss the validity of women judge based on normative Islamic
perspective that called fiqh. This study also aims to analyse the polemics in several ulama’s (Muslim scholars)
perspective about women judge but still based on fiqh as the rules of Islamic law. Methodology used in this study is
qualitative methods with content analysis and Focus Group Discussion (FGD). FGD is conducted at Faculty of Sharia
and Law in Institut Agama Islam Negeri Syekh Nurjati Cirebon with several lecturer and Islamic law expert. The finding
of this study is from at least three famous ulama or Muslim scholar found that the polemic that arose among fiqh
scholars regarding the status of women judges was not only influenced by differences in the use of the problem-solving
method and the perspective of the texts, but it was also largely influenced by socio-cultural factors and the conditions of
the local ulama. Seeing these factors gives reason to give freedom for women to become a judge. This study can be
useful for Islamic law study, gender study, and also socio-cultural study that relating to the position of a woman in the
legal field as a judge. Originality of this study is reveal the validity of women jugde based on Islamic perspective which
is among scholars is still a polemic or differences of opinion. This study can certainly provide clarity to the public
regarding the status of female judges in an Islamic perspective.
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INTRODUCTION
As a teaching that substantially carries the mission of universal justice, Islam positions the judiciary
as something quite important and fundamental. With judicial instruments, it is expected that the
principles of justice, and basic human rights can be maintained properly. Such is the significance of
a judicial process, the texts on the formation of Islamic law regarding justice are paying quite an
intense attention. No wonder then that the Prophet himself, in his day, was not only in the capacity
of spiritual and political leaders, but also the holder of a judicial process.
In its development (after the Prophet and Companions), Fiqh (one of the Islamic Shariah which
specifically discusses the laws governing various aspects of human life, both personal, social and
human life with God (Djazuli, 2010; Sabiq, 1978)) scholars also paid the same attention to their
predecessor figures. The concept of Ikhtiath (means a careful attitude and selective in deciding the
law both from the sharia texts and issues that develop outside the texts. This attitude is very
popularly known in the Shafi'i school of fiqh (A. Zahrah, 1978)) becomes a part of the ulama's
thinking in making the criteria for the validity of a judicial process and the subject being the actor.
One of the concerns of fiqh experts (Yurist) as a form of commitment to the judiciary is its
seriousness in making the criteria of a judge. Their efforts can be understood because of the idealism
they have to build a judicial process that is relatively clean and authoritative and is expected to be as
close as possible to the moral messages of the shariah texts. One agenda that became their discussion
was about the validity of a woman to be a judge in a judicial process. This polemic is understandable
because according to them (ulama) both historically, anthropologically, sociologically and even
normative texts, women are seen to have many weaknesses when faced with a judicial process, more
as an actor determining a judicial dispute (Judge) (Aziz, 2017; Mehdi, 2017; Sonneveld & Tawfik,
2015).
This study does not pretend to "deconstruct" the idea of women's emancipation, which - one of them
- is now being carried out by many women's organizations, but merely wants to study scientifically
the philosophical and sociological basis, why the Islamic religious scholars question the legitimacy
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of women as judge, because it is strongly suspected that the ulama were inspired by the bitter
experiences of women and their social conditions when determining their opinions about women
judges.
LITERATURE REVIEW
A. Normative Islamic Perspective (Fiqh)
As a product of "reason", Islamic jurisprudence not only provides a framework for Islamic legal
thought in the narrow sense. However, it has also made a major contribution to the development
framework of Islamic thought in a more comprehensive sense. The presence of fiqh in the midst of
the struggle of Islamic scholarship since the period of the Companions until the emergence of the
leaders of the schools of thought, apparently also accompanied the ups and downs of the
development of Islam itself. Even in certain periods of the history of Muslims, fiqh in the historical
level has provided many forms of religious thought for the development of Islam from time to time.
Once the "rooted" understanding of the majority of Muslims towards fiqh (fiqh oriented) for
centuries, then there was a quite scathing criticism from the reformers in particular that the factors
causing ignorance in the Islamic scientific tradition, one of them is because Muslims fall into the
tradition of fiqh, tend to too normative. Whereas in his development (tasyrī - legal determination)
Islamic law is very elastic flexible (Ubadah, 1980, p. 10), and at its most vulnerable even sometimes
to the point of considering "sacred" the fiqh products of the scholars (Al-Hajwi, 1977, p. 6). The
most fatal consequence is the cessation of Islamic law at the freezing point of ignorance and the
closing of the doors of ijtihad (the process of establishing Shari'a law by devoting all thoughts and
energy seriously, where it is not discussed in the Qur'an and Hadith), even though ijtihad is the main
key of the overall dynamics of Islamic teachings (Iqbal, 1965, p. 148).
This criticism may be reasonable because the historical phenomenon shows that most Muslims from
a certain period even today, view fiqh, identical with Islamic law in the sense of God's law. With this
perspective, jurisprudence is no longer seen as a historical product of human reasoning that can
change (changeable, relative, adaptable and interpretable) but is seen as in line with God's absolute
law. Such a view arises, it could be due to a lack of understanding of the jurisprudence factor itself
in terms of social interaction. Whereas the history of Islamic institutions from the beginning noticed
that law, (including Islamic law) always changes and colors social interaction, William C. Schuctz
commented (Schutz, 1972, p. 458). In a somewhat different editorial William Friedman, put forward
the same dissertation with C. Schutz, he said, so that there is a less complete understanding of fiqh
(Islamic law), then it must first be understood proportionally the relationship between legal theory
itself and social change as historical process. This is important considering that understanding is the
most fundamental problem of Islamic law (Friedman, 1964, p. 19). Indeed, in many ways there are
fundamental differences in the paradigm of Islamic law with law in a general sense. However, in
certain aspects, there is actually a meeting point between the two. As a result of the weak historical
insight of most Muslims, and the misunderstanding of fiqh which is considered God's law, it is not
surprising then that the characteristics of the development of Islam in a particular era are very much
dominated by the modes of understanding of fiqh. The result can be distortion of fiqh. This distortion
at the most vulnerable point will give birth to sectarianism and fanaticism towards fiqh schools.
Apart from the emergence of these views in the history of the development of Islamic Jurisprudence,
what should be recognized is that Jurisprudence historically was indeed the most valuable product of
the times, Jurisprudence could be used as a basic foothold to examine the thinking of Muslims
globally in a certain period of time. This is at least based on the assumption that the growth and
development of fiqh is identical with the dynamics of the Islamic religious thought itself. In the
meantime, a statement stating that Islamic Jurisprudence, which is said to have been born since the
earliest times of the generation of Islam (companions), was born and developed together with the
life of the people from each time of transition, increasingly obtaining obscurity. From there, a study
of the history of fiqh is not merely a historical value, but it will automatically provide new offers for
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the development of universal Islamic studies in the next period. At the stage of the study which is
the development of aspects of Islamic teachings, the scholars cannot then a priori (break away) to
refer to the heritage of historical products that have been produced by generations of early Muslims
(friends), without exception in the field of fiqh. In this aspect, the Companions have bequeathed
many fiqh products with their diversity. Responsiveness to changing times, critical of the texts of the
texts and even interpretative of the texts, turned out to have become a phenomenon in its own right
among friends. So, no doubt in the time of friends has given birth to treasury which is quite valuable
in the field of fiqh, as an important reference for the development of history in the field of fiqh.
Based on these various facts, the accusations of Western Orientalists that Islamic law was never
born during the early generations of Islam, and Islam in the early generations, is merely a moral
religion and not a religion of law, (thus Joseph Schacht's conclusion in his work The Origin of
Muhammdan Jurisprudence, In a different editor even Norman J. Coulson supports the dissertation
presented by Schacht (Coulson, 1964, p. 4), including the modern Islamic thinker Asaf AA Fyzee
(Fyzee, 1964, pp. 26–28)). It seems to me that the writer's opinion is a historical accusation. It is
evident that efforts to accelerate the revelation texts with social conditions to build a new paradigm
of Islamic law that is more relevant to the context of the era (ijtihad), have been going on since the
earliest times of the Islamic generation.
B. Argumentative Basis that Related with Women Judges
There are at least three groups of scholars who have different opinions regarding the validity of
women judges. Each of them has an argumentative basis that is quite valid both from the shari'at
texts and aqli, including:
1. First, women are not legal judges, this opinion is represented by famous school leaders such as
Imam Malik, Shafi'i and Ahmad Ibnu Hanbal.
2. Second, women are legitimate to be judges, except in the case of hudud (criminal) and qishah,
this opinion is represented by a rational fiqh figure, Imam Abu Hanifah.
3. Third, women are legitimate judges in all cases (civil, and pridana), this opinion is represented
by Imam Ibn Jarir Al-Thabary. In line with Imam Thabary, Imam Ibn Hazm also expressed the
ability of women as judges in absolute terms, not least in civil or criminal matters, this means
that women are legitimate judges.
METHODOLOGY
This study uses qualitative method, including content analysis and Focus Discussion Group (FGD)
that conducted in Institut Agama Islam Negeri Syekh Nurjati, Cirebon, Indonesia. The content
analytics method, namely describing the particular object that related with the study. The object of
study in this method is human ideas or thoughts revealed in the primary or secondary manuscripts.
Data collection of this study uses library as primary sources which is analysed with the following
steps: (a) description, (b) discussion, and (c) enrichment and criticism, then (d) conducting analytic
studies of primary ideas through analysis of relationships, comparisons, and development of rational
models (Suriasumantri, 2001). While FGD is a method to equating perceptions, classifying,
verifying, and validating a case (Manoranjitham & Jacob, 2007; Masadeh, 2012; Stewart et al.,
2012). Therefore, the content analytics result is discussed in FGD to strengthen the findings related
to the polemic of the validity of a woman being a judge.
RESULTS/FINDINGS
Women Judge in the Polemic Expert Fiqh
The discourse on empowering women, which is now a trend in the development of thought, seems to
be the climax process of the bitter journey of women in the past in any part of the world. The pre-
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Islamic era, for example, by observing one case of women in the city of Athens (Greece)
experienced very bad treatment and tended to be very discriminatory. Women at that time were
considered as animals that could be easily traded, were not given the right to manage the wealth he
had, in the view of Greek law at that time was seen only as a "domestic servant" with the sole task of
giving birth to children. Their sanctity is slumped lower than animals and even equated with unclean
acts and Shaytan, when it is no longer needed by men (Al-Khuli, n.d., p. 7). This situation is
experienced by almost all women - including pre-Islamic Arab societies - especially when Islam has
not yet come to bring its mission.
Islam with the set of values it carries tries to carry out a "revolutionary" process of humanity's view
of women in the Arab world. Slowly but surely, Islamic Sharia began to lift women from the long-
standing discriminatory puddle in Arab society. women in the treatise of Islam are actually
considered to have rights - which can be called the same - as men, have equal rights and obligations
both in the spiritual, moral, economic and legal rights (in legal terms) (Lubis, 1991, p. 16). Legally
formal women and men actually have rights and obligations that are reciprocal, the difference in the
legal portion if there is actually more due to consideration of differences in biological aspects.
The position of women in Islam in the development of Islam has actually experienced significant
enlightenment, only if then there was a polemic of the ulama in the capacity of women as judges, it
was inseparable from the social settings of the scholars who looked at it at the time. Certain social,
cultural, and community structure conditions are suspected to have had a significant contribution to
the ulama's thinking in viewing the position of women as Judges. Besides that, the judicial issue is
still considered something risky if it has to be left to women. That is why fiqh scholars have made
maximum efforts to make formal qualifications for a judge.
Normatively, classical ulama fiqh scholars for example have made quite selective requirements for a
judge including, Islam, independence, men, mukallaf, 'fair, listening, can speak fluently, can write
and most importantly have moral integrity and control Islamic Shariah. The logical consequence of
this requirement is that prospective judges who do not have the criteria - if they impose - are not
considered to have sufficient legal status. Because one of the conditions - explicitly - must also be a
man, so if a woman becomes a judge, its validity cannot be justified legally. Another impact of this
statement means that all decisions made from something that is not legal will certainly produce a
product that is legally ill.
In the Focus Discussion Group forum organized by the Syari'ah Department of IAIN Cirebon related
to the validity of female judges, the results of the analysis of at least were represented by well-
known religious leaders (Muslim scholar) such as Imam Malik, Shafi'i and Ahmad Ibnu Hanbal. The
result of analysis and discussion will be explained in detail in the discussion section.
DISCUSSION / ANALYSIS
A. Analysis of Argumentative Basis
This section provides the analysis of three group of Muslim scholars that related with validity of
women judge, among others:
1. According to the records of Muhammad Abu Al-‘Ainaini, the group of scholars who doubted the
validity of women as judges, as represented by Malik and Shafi'i imams, were guided by the text
of Al-Qur'an at An-Nisa verse 47. According to the interpretation of the clerics of this group, the
word "excess" referred to in the verse is related to the use of logic and thought, which in many
cases - especially in the context of the judicial process - women cannot do the same thing as men
(Al-‘Ainaini, 1983, p. 124). Furthermore, Hamid Muhammad Abu Talib argued that the presence
of women in a judicial process - especially as a judge - could cause defamation, especially
contrary to the prevailing norm in society, therefore their testimony should not be recognized
legally. The presence of women in the judicial process is considered unusual and will weaken a
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judicial process because of the mental limitations and talents of women both as witnesses and -
so - as defendants (Thalib, 1982, p. 76). Another argument put forward by this group is the
Sunnah Rasul (Hadith), which narrates the death of king Kisra, the Prophet had raised a question
among friends, "who do you think (companions) who is worthy to replace king Kisra?”, the
friends immediately replied, "of course his daughter named Nora, in lieu of the king," Then the
Prophet immediately counter-answered the friend by stating "Will not experience success, a
nation if the leader is handed over to women." (al-Hadith). When interpreting the hadith some
scholars who forbid judges from women also use the logic of syllogism (almost identical to the
qiyas). The logic of syllogism used by scholars in understanding the hadith is that, the hadith is
reproachful, while reproach carries a prohibition, and furthermore the prohibition means it also
shows that something bad is prohibited (Al-‘Ainaini, 1983, p. 24). From this statement, it is clear
that whatever the reasons for the validity of women as Judges remain irresponsible, or in other
words, as a judge. Not only using sharia texts as arguments for the prohibition of women as
judges, but they also put forward historical factors that developed in the Islamic civilization. It is
said that - according to them - it has never been recorded in history, the Messenger of Allah and
his companions afterwards (khulafa al-Rasyidin), appointed women as judges that women do
(Thalib, 1982, p. 76). Regardless of the accuracy of the arguments used by this first group of
scholars, it is clear that women are not legitimate if appointed as judges.
2. It is different from the opinion of the first group, Imam Abu Hanifa instead put forward another
argument, and concluded that it is legitimate if women become judges as long as the case they
are dealing with is not a criminal case. (This opinion seems analogous to the status of women's
testimony). As long as a woman's testimony is considered valid in a civil matter, she is also valid
if she is in the position of judge on the matter (Al-Humam, n.d., pp. 252–253). Just to be
understood, that Imam Abu Hanifah does not allow women as judges in criminal cases (hudud
and qishah). Hudud is the limits of the provisions of Allah regarding the punishment given to
someone who violates Islamic criminal acts while the qishahs are sentences imposed on someone
who commits criminal acts in a similar retaliation, such as murder, injuring a limb and so forth
regulated by shari'ah Islam (Mujib & et al, 1994, pp. 106&278). Hanifah does not allow women
as judges in the cases of hudud and qishah because in shari'ah the testimony of one woman on
the issue of hudud and qishah is unacceptable, so of course alone as a judge in matters the same
one. So for Abu Hanifah the validity of women as judges is only on civil matters.
3. Meanwhile the third group of scholars (who allowed women as judges mutually) represented by
Ibn Jarir Ath-Thabary, and Mrs. Hazm, argued on several points, namely (Al-Syirazy, n.d., pp.
17–18): (1) None of the verses in the Qur'an nor the statement of the Apostle (Hadith) expressly
forbids women as judges; (2) In contrast to the first group that did not find historical data on
female judges, according to Ibn Jarir it had historically been the appointment of a woman as a
judge, during the time of Umar Ibn Khattab, who appointed women to be judges of the al-Syuq
tribe, named Al-Syifa; (3) Using an analogy to the validity of a woman's fatwa which is
considered valid, in other words if women's fatwa is considered valid, then of course her
decision as a right can be considered valid.
B. Socio-Cultural Analysis of Ulama's Thinking About Women Judges
Any legal theory, including Islamic law in the sense of fiqh, recognizes that the socio-cultural
conditions of a place have a very significant contribution to the style and thinking of a legal figure
(ulama) (Friedman, 1964). This is what is often pointed out in one of the rules, that "It is undeniable,
that law - without exception Islamic law always changes according to changes in time and
circumstances". This rule is quite popular among Western legal experts, that in order to comprehend
comprehensively about law, it must be seen the relationship between legal theories themselves and
social change as an ongoing historical process, because law itself is also born of social interaction.
In the history of Islamic fiqh formulations, it is usual for the ulama to always consider the socio-
cultural implications and conditions in producing products of legal thinking, on this basis it is no
wonder that fiqh products are actually very particularistic, in other words, ulama's thoughts during
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the then it is not intended to be generally applied, this is understandable because the fuqaha products
are actually born from the results of a particular environment and culture and from a certain period
in the past. he might be relevant to the context of his time and the place where the scholars gave his
fatwa, but it could be later no longer relevant if actualized in the context of the times and different
social conditions. This condition also applies to fiqh ulama products in determining their opinions on
the position of women as judges, it may be possible and even can be strongly suspected that socio-
cultural environmental factors have a big contribution to differences among scholars.
As we know, madzhab figures such as Maliki and Syafi'i, argue that illegitimate women become
judges, this is understandable because women in Hijaz (where Malik and also Shafi'i once lived), are
still very attached to social structures to Arabans who tend to be exclusive, accustomed to the
seclusion tradition. Their freedom to carry out activities outside the home is severely restricted. The
conditions of Hijaz and Medina which tended to be modest, simple and far from the influence of
outside cultures and their problems (Zaid, 1989), further reinforced local traditions for the
population, including the status of women. "Tilted" towards women. This factor seems to have made
the ulama limit the role of women in their capacity as judges.
Another factor that can be surmised as to why Imam Malik prohibits women as judges, is his attitude
to commitment to the Rasul of the Prophet where explicitly as stated earlier, there are indications of
the Prophet's hadith which prohibits women's involvement in the leadership process. True to his
stance on this hadith in such a manner also seems to be Imam Malik not willing to take the risk by
allowing women as judges. The same opinion was also conveyed by Imam Shafi'i, although he did
not stay long in Medina, it could be that Malik's thought, which had become his teacher in the field
of hadith, influenced Shafi'i (M. A. Zahrah, 1978). No wonder he also forbids women to become
judges. As is known, Shafi'i thinking in the field of fiqh is a synthesis of two poles (Ahlu hadith
represented by Malik and ahlu ra'yi represented by Abu Hanifah) then it can be suspected that
thinking of Malik thinking is widely adopted by Shafi'i, one of which is about women judges.
Unlike the case with Imam Abu Hanifah - according to whom women may be judges - life in the
Iraqi region where acculturation of foreign culture is already so thick, the thinking of the people is
already as liberal. The conditions in Iraq where Hanafi lived had been more advanced than the Hijaz.
Acculturation with the Persians who had advanced first had been built a long time ago. So that more
or less developed Persian culture influenced the way of thinking of the Iraqi people. The more
developed the nation's culture, the better their views on women. Therefore, the position of women in
Iraq is better than the position of women in Hijaz.
This contrasting contrast seems to have also had a profound effect on the discourse of the scholars
(Syarifuddin, 1993). So once again it can be understood if Abu Hanifah then allowed women as
Judges, because the Iraqi culture at that time made it possible in that direction. Such socio-cultural
conditions influence Islamic legal thinking from mujtahids, including Ibn Jarir At-Thabary and Ibn
Hazm, who are more liberal in declaring the freedom and legitimacy of women as absolute judges.
Ibn Hazm is a fiqh figure who tends to be literalist (textual), he is a follower of Imam Daud Adz-
Dzhahiri's school of thought which is also known as a literalist figure.
Another factor why there are differences in the views of scholars in Hijaz and Iraq is, If in Hijaz
tends to want to maintain the tradition of the texts and the hadith of the Prophet, then in Iraq it is
more prioritizing the thought of reason and free reasoning. That was then the traditional Hijaz and
Iraqi rational fiqh. The tradition of the use of ra'yu in such a way even then rapidly developed in the
discourse of Islamic fiqh, which in turn also affects the style of fiqh that is developing. As a result
the ability of women as judges embraced by the third group is also allegedly strong due to the
freedom of ratio used as istinbath (activity carried out by fiqh or legal experts to reveal a proposition
that is used as a basis in drawing a conclusion to answer a problem or solve a problem).
CONCLUSION
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The polemic of fiqh scholars (Ulama) regarding the status of women, besides due to differences in
the use of the istinbath method and the perspective of the texts, it turns out that many are also
influenced by socio-cultural factors and the conditions of local scholars. If in certain societies the
tradition of seclusion against women is still so dominant, as in the Hijaz region when Imam Malik
lived, then the fatwa on female judges was a reflection of this condition. Conversely, if the culture of
society tends to be liberal, acculturation of culture enters swiftly like in Iraq when Hanafi lived, then
even female judges are considered to have no problems and are legitimate. Likewise, the conditions
of the community when Ibn Jarir At-Thabary lived. This is sufficient reason to give freedom to
women as absolute judges.
LIMITATION AND STUDY FORWARD
The limitation of this study is that the majority of content analysis is sourced from books as libraries.
So that for future research studies can be expanded by analysing the latest studies related to gender,
especially the role of women as judges, especially in the current era of digital technology which is
certainly still based on an Islamic perspective.
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